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WHEN LAW AND MEDICINE COLLIDE
The Hon. Richard C. Wesley t
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL CHARLES E. STEINBERG LECTURE IN
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW'
University of Rochester Medical Center
September 25, 2002
This lecture series is named after Charles E. Steinberg. For sixteen
years, doctors, lawyers and judges - three from my Court are counted
among the group - have come to this great medical school to talk about
topics as varied as forensic psychiatry and domestic violence.
What a grand tribute to such a wonderful man. Because this lecture
series bears his name and is dedicated to his commitment to medicine/
psychiatry and the law, I think it appropriate to begin today with a few
reflections on Charlie and how our life paths crossed. In 1987, following
my election to New York Supreme Court, I was assigned to hear civil
cases in Monroe County. At some point in time, I am not sure when,
Charlie Steinberg had a case in front of me. I have no recollection of the
issue or the result; however, I distinctly recall Charlie's happy warrior
presence. It was clear to me that Charles Steinberg loved being with
lawyers and enjoyed the controlled conflict of the courtroom.
In 1991, I was reassigned to hear criminal cases. My new work
introduced me to a different segment of the Monroe County Bar, but
there was Charlie, representing defendants with the same zeal and good-
natured toughness he had shown on the civil side. It was at this time that
I came to know Charlie better and received my best view of his skills as
a trial lawyer.
Kenneth Brown was charged with murder in the second degree for
shooting a woman over a dispute about the price of a stereo. It was my
first murder trial and Charlie represented Brown. Just prior to the trial,
Charlie's daughter Liz came to my chambers and asked a favor. Charlie
t Associate Judge, New York State Court of Appeals. The author would like to ac-
knowledge the invaluable assistance he has received in the preparation of this speech from law
clerks Zainab Chaudhry and Kathryn Carney Cole.
I Charles E. Steinberg was a distinguished lawyer and Clinical Professor of Psychiatry
(Law) at the University of Rochester School of Medicine who had a strong commitment to
bridging the interface between law and medicine. In 1988, on the occasion of his seventieth
birthday, and in recognition of his outstanding contributions to the field of psychiatry and the
law, the Department of Psychiatry created the Charles E. Steinberg Fellowship and Lecture in
Psychiatry and the Law at the University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry.
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was a diabetic and Liz was concerned that the stress of the trial might
throw Charlie into insulin shock. She hoped we might be willing to put
some orange juice in our refrigerator just in case Charlie needed a boost.
My dad was a "brittle diabetic." I was well aware of the early signs of
insulin shock - the distracted look and the mood changes. I was more
than happy to keep an eye on Charlie and time the recesses to meet his
needs.
Charlie tried a good case, but the defendant's guilt was clear. Not
once during that trial did Charlie complain of discomfort or concern for
himself, although he did like the orange juice during the breaks. During
a few of those breaks Charlie would talk about his interest in psychiatry
and the law. I never appreciated the depth of that interest until Dr. Cic-
cone gave me Charlie's curriculum vitae. Charlie clearly understood that
doctors and lawyers had a good deal of common ground. This lecture is
dedicated to that view.
As you can imagine, I am called upon often to talk about the law
and law-related subjects. But I must confess, I am a bit uneasy talking to
a group predominantly made up of doctors. It's not that I don't like
doctors - I do. I have a great personal physician and I have worked
with some wonderful physicians over the years in handling cases involv-
ing medical issues. My mother worked as a Licensed Practical Nurse at
Highland Hospital in Rochester for many years. I don't have any prob-
lem in talking to you about the law, but medicine - let alone psychiatry
- that makes me a little nervous. As Dr. Ciccone pointed out, I have a
curious public service interest. I drive ambulances instead of chasing
them. I have come here to the Strong Emergency Room ("ER") on many
occasions, and during those trips often observed the intersection of law
and medicine in times of triumph and tragedy. I do so not as a judge or a
lawyer involved with a case, but as a volunteer.
On the night before Chief Judge Kaye's Steinberg speech, I had
been called out to drive our ambulance to a double fatality involving
local teenagers. Despite the efforts of my dedicated crew, we knew the
girl in our care, not much younger than my son, would not survive. By
the time we reached the emergency room here at Strong, she was gone.
A doctor came out to make the call and pronounce her dead. Initially, I
did not look at that experience as speech material, but somehow the dis-
tance of time and self-healing lets me use it as an introductory example
of how medicine and science are intertwined with law.
Medical science plays a key role in many legal determinations. The
ER doctor who made the call on the young accident victim was perform-
ing both a legal and medical function in declaring her death. Another
doctor, a pathologist, would later examine her and determine the cause of
death - each function dictated by law - each appropriately delegated
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to physicians. The law sorts out the legal ramifications of death while
relying on medicine to analyze the facts necessary to make the determi-
nation. The law decides who is responsible both civilly and criminally
for the death; medicine helps us understand the causes and assists the law
in marshalling the facts surrounding that event.
Both disciplines share a common goal - the ultimate well-being of
individuals and society as understood by each discipline. Both can exist
in harmony. The law has embraced science in many areas and has long
used it to help provide answers to serious factual questions. Judge Car-
dozo noted to the New York Academy of Medicine in 1928, "what di-
vides and distracts us in the solution of a legal problem is not so much
uncertainty about the law as uncertainty about the facts - the facts
which generate the law .. . . We look then to you, to the students of
mind and body, for the nutriment of fact, .... that in many a trying hour
will give vitality and vigor to the tissues of our law."2
The intersection of law and medical science that night in the ER was
a good fit, but that is not always the case. Law does not always easily
integrate new knowledge. It must first be proven to be reliable - we
lawyers would say valid.3 Moreover, scientific advances and their impli-
cations often present conflicting views. The law is an organic balancing
of social and moral concerns that seeks to resolve disputes quickly, fairly
and finally.
Medical science can outdistance law, it can change the paradigmatic
calculus. It can muddy the analytical waters of legal relationships. Sci-
ence need not always concern itself with the social implications of new
knowledge, but the law must. As one writer noted, the interaction be-
tween law and science is "a ballet with its own nuances, rhythms, and
delicate steps."'4
Let's briefly focus on three areas of medical science - each
presenting a different degree of "fit" with the law - each challenging
lawyers, judges and social planners (a euphemism for politicians) to re-
think legal principles and policies. To put the importance of our task
today in context, one legal scholar has observed that the interaction be-
tween law and science is a most important area of inquiry "for it is at this
2 Benjamin N. Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law, Address Before the NY
Academy of Medicine (Nov. 1, 1928), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CAR-
Dozo, at 371, 373-74 (Margaret Hall ed. 1975).
3 In New York, novel scientific evidence must be accepted as reliable within the scien-
tific community generally. See People v. Wernick, 89 N.Y.2d 111, 115 (1996); Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In federal courts, the Frye test has been superceded by
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permit scientific evidence if it aids the factfinder in
understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4 Declan McCullagh, Technology as Security, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 131
(2001).
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point that law either becomes a tool for shaping the future or an obsolete
inconvenience circumvented by increasing technological innovation."'5
Let's begin with a look at an area where science and medical tech-
nology have outdistanced long-standing legal concepts - reproductive
technology. In the last decade, in vitro fertilization has become com-
monplace. For example, my neighbor and her husband are blessed with a
"dish" baby. Today, fertilized eggs are stored and sometimes shared.
Now, fathers can come from a sperm bank and large mammals have even
been cloned.
Who owns reproductive material in the event of death or divorce?
Is genetic material property? Four years ago, my Court confronted these
issues. 6 Mr. and Mrs. Kass had stored a number of "pre-zygotes" as part
of their regimen to make a baby.7 When love waned, Ms. Kass wanted
to take control of the eggs8 - she saw it as her last chance at mother-
hood. Mr. Kass had other ideas; he was not interested in becoming a
father with his now former wife.9 If Ms. Kass prevailed, who would be
the father of the child, and would that "father" be required to support the
child? Fortunately, the clinic that worked with Mr. and Mrs. Kass had a
thoughtful and thorough agreement that resolved the case.10 While some
legislatures have enacted statutes dealing with the problem, most have
not. I"
Current reproductive technology also permits the possibility of a
birth long after the death of the biological parent. The laws of inheri-
tance traditionally account for posthumous children by creating a pre-
sumption of paternity when the child is born to a spouse within a
prescribed time after the father's death. Today, a child born years after a
5 James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues Raised by the
Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
743, 744 (1998).
6 See Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (1998).
7 Id. at 559.
8 Id. at 560.
9 Id. (describing the husband's opposition to any further attempts by Mrs. Kass to
achieve pregnancy using the pre-zygotes).
10 Id. at 564-65 (holding the case was not of a constitutional dimension and agreements
between gamete donors should generally be presumed valid and binding).
I I See id. at 562-63 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2002)) (stating that couples
must execute written agreements providing for disposition of stored embryos in the event of
death, divorce or other unforeseen circumstances); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13 to
-B:15, -B:18 (2002) (requiring couples to undergo medical exams and counseling, and impos-
ing a fourteen-day limit for maintenance of noncryo-preserved, ex utero pre-zygotes); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-9:133 (West 2000) (considering pre-zygotes a "juridical person"
that must be implanted; it is not the property of donors or physicians to be owned and cannot
be intentionally destroyed). New York is not among the states having legislatively addressed
the issue. Proposed legislation to require written directives for the disposition of embryos has
consistently died in committee. See, e.g., S.B. 5815, 221st Leg. (N.Y. 1997); S.B. 1120, 222d
Leg. (N.Y. 1999); S.B. 671, 224th Leg. (N.Y. 2001).
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parent's death - no longer an impossibility - could be problematic,
especially if it is clear that the decedent parent intended to create a child
posthumously. 12
The permutations and problems are endless. Human experience has
a unique way of creating an exception to every rule as soon as it is for-
mulated. What seems clear is that we have separated the biological func-
tion of procreation from the social/legal model of a procreative family.
Biological parenthood and its attendant responsibilities can no longer
provide the only framework in which to analyze human interaction in
this area. We have overcome the limitations of our bodies, not through
alternative socio-legal practices such as adoption, but through medical
techniques that do not easily fit the legal molds that have worked so well
in the past. 13
One solution that has been suggested would be to retain existing
rules for children produced by traditional methods, but define parenthood
when created by non-traditional means as the person or persons who in-
tended to take parental responsibility when the events that produced the
child took place. 14 States might also require a written declaration of pa-
rental intent be filed prior to any medically-assisted reproduction. 15
Measuring one's intent is always an interesting exercise. Memories fade
or change as time dulls the ardor and the clear light of parenthood damp-
ens one's enthusiasm. The legal and public policy implications of repro-
ductive technology are just beginning to come into focus.
Let's move on and examine a second intersection of law and
medicine that portrays the benefits that result when medical science
works in tandem with legal process. Faye was raped and sodomized in
12 See generally Bailey, supra note 5. Only one high court has considered the question
of posthumously-conceived genetic children's inheritance rights under state intestacy laws.
See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 435 Mass. 536 (2002), in which the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that, under specific circumstances, children conceived after a parent's
death are entitled to inheritance rights. The case involved twins conceived from frozen sperm
and born two years after the father's death from leukemia. The court stated the surviving
parent or legal representative must establish a genetic relationship between the child and the
decedent and prove that the decedent affirmatively consented to the posthumous conception
and the support of arny resulting child. Id. at 554.
13 See, for example, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (1998), in which
one California court was asked to address child support issues in a case where a genetically
unrelated child was conceived during the parties' marriage through a donor egg, donor sperm
and a surrogate mother. The appellate court wisely rejected the trial court's astounding con-
clusion that the child had no lawful parents. Id.
14 See David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 71, 72 (2001). Some courts have used this approach. For example, in Johnson v. Cal-
vert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993), the California Supreme Court held that "she who intended
to procreate the child - that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own - is the natural mother under California law.")
15 Friedman, supra note 14, at 77 n.20.
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her home in Virginia in July of 1985.16 The day after the attack, Faye
looked at photographs, including one of Walter Snyder, a neighbor. She
immediately dropped his photo in the discard pile. She was unable to
identify her assailant from any other photos. Two weeks after the attack,
however, Faye saw Walter washing his car across the street and suddenly
recognized him as "the one."' 7
Walter was charged and convicted, but continued to assert his inno-
cence. His family struggled to seek his release. After DNA testing be-
came available, Walter was excluded as the perpetrator and was
ultimately granted clemency. Despite the certainty of his exclusion, Faye
continued to insist that Walter was her attacker.' 8 This case and others
underscore the power of DNA evidence and the law's integration of that
technology into the factfinding process.
DNA technology and profiling have become an essential component
of the criminal justice system. The law has embraced the technology
because it gives hard, objective facts that are reliable and valid. If the
DNA does not fit, you must acquit. Many criminal justice experts feel
that DNA is the single most significant tool since the fingerprint.1 9 In
less than a decade, DNA evidence had become widely used and accepted
by police, prosecutors, defense counsel and a majority of courts. 20 My
court, the New York Court of Appeals, approved the use of DNA profil-
ing evidence in 1994 in People v. George Wesley2' - no relation! Al-
though the Court at that time was not unanimous, if Wesley were decided
today there is no doubt that we would agree with the National Research
Council's conclusion that "'[t]he state of the profiling technology and
the methods for estimating frequencies and related statistics have
progressed to the point where the admissibility of properly collected and
16 BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How
TO MAKE IT RIGHT 59-100 (2001).
17 Id.
18 This case also highlights the current debate on the reliability of eyewitness testimony.
See, e.g., People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 (2001); Ralph Norman Haber, Experiencing, Remem-
bering and Reporting Events, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1057 (2000); Roger B. Handberg,
Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1013 (1995).
19 NAT'L INST. FOR JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED
BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER
TRIAL 4 (1996), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/for96.htm. Traditional fingerprint-
ing was quickly seen and accepted as enormously powerful, persuasive and virtually certain
proof. Interestingly, however, one legal scholar argues the technique received only minimal
scrutiny at the time and that challenges to DNA profiling, in connection with doctrinal shifts in
the standards governing the admissibility of expert evidence, have now opened the door to new
challenges to traditional fingerprint evidence threatening to destabilize that form of proof. See
Jennifer Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13
(2001).
20 NAT'L INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 4.
21 83 N.Y.2d 417 (1994).
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analyzed data should not be in doubt."' 22 Some states have such confi-
dence in this data that they have eliminated the availability of the statute
of limitations defense in sex offense and other cases when DNA is
available. 23
The impact of DNA technology is not always as dramatic as setting
an innocent defendant free. Almost thirty years ago when I first started
practicing law I developed a peculiar specialty - paternity proceedings.
At that time blood type testing could only eliminate a prospective father
from the allegations of paternity. The trials, to be frank, were dicey. The
proof was all about access and inclination. The "he said/she said" nature
of the proof presented a formidable obstacle to many mothers who
sought paternity determinations as part of an attempt to procure child
support from reluctant fathers. The Supreme Court of the United States
and my Court recognized the difficult nature of these cases. 24
DNA has changed all that. Paternity determinations no longer hinge
on the sordid details of a love affair gone wrong, but rather on statistical
probabilities approaching 99.9% that indeed defendant is the father. To
be honest, it took some of the fun out of my little area of expertise. In
my view, it eliminated the need to settle cases through child support
agreements that allow putative fathers to disinherit their children by
avoiding paternity determinations. The technology has literally reversed
the constitutional analysis.
But with the certainty of parenthood, another legal difficulty arises.
Many dads are learning that indeed they are not the biological parent of a
child born during a marriage or relationship. Who is a parent to a child?
The biological progenitor or the fellow who has loved the child as his
own because he always thought it was so? A number of fathers' groups
have seized on the DNA technology to demand new legislation allowing
a father absolution from supporting a child that is not his biological off-
22 NAT'L INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 6 (quoting NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (prepublication
copy) 2:14 [1996]).
23 See Panel Two, Criminal Law and DNA Science: Balancing Societal Interests and
Civil Liberties, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 401, 409 n.12 (2002); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 1-6(c)
(West 2002) (holding that when the prosecution is supported by physical evidence not identi-
fying the actor by means of DNA evidence, the limitations period does not start to run until the
State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA evidence necessary to estab-
lish the identification of the actor by means of comparison); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 12.01(l)(B) (Vernon 2002) (providing no limitation period for felony sexual assaults if dur-
ing investigation, biological matter is collected and subjected to forensic DNA testing and
results show that the sample does not match either the victim or any other person whose
identity is readily ascertained).
24 See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97 (1982); Bacon v. Bacon, 46 N.Y.2d
477, 480 (1979).
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spring despite the "father's" long-standing view otherwise. 25 Not a ring-
ing endorsement of fathers, I might add. State legislatures and courts
across the country will now have to sort that out. In this instance, medi-
cal technology has peeled away the cover of little secrets that were often
presumed, but never provable.
DNA technology produces a nice tight set of numbers. And while
the technology of DNA profiling raises a number of legal and social is-
sues, 26 there is no great tension between the technology itself and the
legal process. That is not the case, however, in a third area of intersec-
tion between the law and medicine that I suspect is of interest to many of
you here today.
Evidence about an individual's mental health presents an interesting
contrast to the success of DNA evidence. When judges and juries seek to
render legal/factual conclusions about someone's mental health, they
generally are not presented with clear-cut descriptions of objective facts.
Rather, the proof is often overlaid with difficult interpretations of subtle,
subjective evaluations. As one commentator has noted, research indi-
cates that "mental health professionals ... may disagree more than half
the time even on major diagnostic categories such as schizophrenia and
organic brain syndrome." 27
Further, "[c]laims about past mental states relevant to exculpatory
criminal law doctrines are very difficult to confirm or disprove scientifi-
cally.... [O]ur ability to know what was going on in someone's mind at
the time of a criminal act is severely limited," requiring "an assessment
of the strength of beliefs or urges."'2 8 Even the American Medical Asso-
ciation has expressed concern about the findings of mental health profes-
25 Those challenging state child support laws argue that if DNA testing can be used to
exonerate wrongfully convicted death-row inmates, it should be able to release men from child
support orders entered under a false premise of paternity. A few states have enacted, or are
considering enacting, legislation allowing release from paying child support in such cases
when paternity is disproved. See Non-fathers Fight Child Support Laws, ROCHESTER DEMO-
CRAT & CHRONICLE, June 17, 2002, at 2A.
26 DNA technology has spun off a number of concerns with regard to criminal justice
issues, the creation and maintenance of DNA databanks, the implications for insurance law,
eugenics and privacy/discrimination issues in the workplace. See, e.g., Glendora Hughes, Ge-
netically Incorrect: Genetic Privacy and Protection in the Workplace, 35 MD. B.J. 34 (Jan./
Feb. 2002); Jerry Elmer, Human Genomics: Toward a New Paradigm for Equal-Protection
Jurisprudence, Part II, 50 R.I. B.J. II (May/June 2002); Samuel C. Seiden et al., The Physi-
cian as Gatekeeper to the Use of Genetic Information in the Criminal Justice System, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 88 (Spring 2002); David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for
Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179 (2001); Mark A. Rothstein et al., Legal and Policy
Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127
(2001); Edward J. Imwinkelried et al., DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH.
L. REV. 413 (2001).
27 Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case Study,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 919, 920 (2000).
28 Id. at 927-28.
WHEN LAW AND MEDICINE COLLIDE
sionals being used as conclusive proof of this ultimate factual question.
It noted, "'it is impossible for psychiatrists to determine whether a
mental impairment has affected the defendant's capacity for voluntary
choice, or caused him to commit the particular act in question.' "29
Nevertheless, the medical/scientific view of human behavior does
shape the legal view of human conduct to a large extent. Subjective
mental states and mental/developmental deficiencies are relevant in the
criminal law, both in determining blameworthiness at trial and as miti-
gating factors at sentencing. 30 For example, under the traditional in-
sanity defense,3' if a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity, the
state can continue to confine him legitimately as long as he continues to
be both dangerous and mentally ill.32
In response to data indicating a high degree of recidivism among
sex offenders and the public's understandable ever-growing concern
about child abduction and pedophilia, some states have enacted statutes
that require involuntary commitment of those convicted of certain violent
sexual crimes after completion of the criminal sentence if the offender
suffers from a mental abnormality and is likely to engage in repeat acts
of sexual violence as a result.33 As of last year, seventeen states had
enacted this type of legislation. 34
In 1984, Leroy Hendricks was convicted of taking "indecent liber-
ties" with two young boys. 35 In 1994, shortly before his scheduled re-
29 Georgia Smith Hamilton, The Blurry Line Between "Mad" and "Bad": Is "Lack-of-
Control" a Workable Standard for Sexually Violent Predators?, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 481, 502
(2002) (quoting Bd. of Trustees Am. Med. Ass'n, Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials and
Limitation of Psychiatric Testimony, 251 JAMA 2967, 2978 [1984]).
30 See Slobogin, supra note 27, at 925.
31 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (1998) (explaining lack of criminal responsibility
to mean that "at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, [the defen-
dant] lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate either: 1. The nature and consequences
of such conduct; or 2. That such conduct was wrong").
32 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1982); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71
(1991); In re David B., 97 N.Y.2d 267, 278-79 (2002). The definition of insanity and what
constitutes mental illness has been the subject of much debate, particularly because the prevail-
ing legal standard for the insanity defense was established in the first instance by courts and
not the medical profession, beginning in 1843 in England with the M'Naghten case. See
Michael Edmund O'Neill, Stalking the Mark of Cain, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 34
(2001); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1208-14 (2000); see also M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng.
Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843) (creating a rule that excused a person who either did not know "the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it ... he did not know he was
doing what was wrong").
33 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 (1994).
34 See John W. Parry, Shrinking Civil Rights of Alleged Sexually Violent Predators, 25
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 318, 321 (May/June 2001) (listing state statutes
authorizing involuntary commitment for sexually violent persons; New York is not one of
those states).
35 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997).
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lease, the state of Kansas sought to have him civilly confined as a
sexually violent predator. 36 Hendricks' own testimony at the retention
trial revealed a disturbing pattern of repeated child sexual molestation
and abuse, including his own stepchildren. 37 He explained he could not
control his urge to molest children and the only sure way he could keep
from doing so in the future was "to die."'38 The state's psychologist testi-
fied that Hendricks suffered from pedophilia and was likely to commit
future sexual offenses if not confined and that pedophilia qualified as a
"mental abnormality" under the statute.39 A psychiatrist called by Hen-
dricks, however, stated it was not possible to predict with any degree of
accuracy the future dangerousness of a sex offender. 40 The jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks was a sexually violent
predator and he was retained in a secure facility. 41
In reviewing Hendricks' case, the United States Supreme Court held
the statute's requirements of dangerousness and mental abnormality sat-
isfied due process, rejecting Hendricks' assertion that a specific finding
of "mental illness," as opposed to a "mental abnormality," was re-
quired. 42 The Court stated that legislatures need not adopt specific medi-
cal terms in drafting civil commitment laws and that traditionally
legislatures have been given the task of "defining terms of a medical
nature that have legal significance. '43 The Court further noted that al-
though legal definitions often do not fit precisely within the definitions
employed by the medical community, they need not mirror them.44 Ulti-
mately, the Court held that the Act's criteria, including a finding of
mental abnormality, properly limited confinement to "those who suffer
from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their
control", 45 and that the evidence adduced at the trial established proof of
Hendricks' uncontrollable behavior.
In 1993, Michael Crane exposed himself to a tanning salon attend-
ant and a half-hour later to a video store clerk. 46 He grabbed the clerk by
the neck, demanded oral sex, and then threatened to rape her.47 After
Crane pleaded guilty, the state of Kansas sought a commitment under its
36 Id. at 354.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 355.
39 Id. at 356 n.2.
40 Id.
4' Id.
42 Id. at 359-60.
43 Id. at 359.
44 ld.
45 Id. at 358.
46 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
47 Id.
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Act. 48 The state's psychiatric experts diagnosed Crane as suffering from
exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder.49 Crane argued that
the personality disorder diagnosis did not lead to the conclusion that he
suffered from a volitional impairment which resulted in his inability to
control his behavior.50 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court clar-
ified its decision in Hendricks by rejecting a strict volitional control re-
quirement. 5' It held that a finding of complete or total lack of control
over one's behavior was not necessary; all that was required was some
finding of a lack of control - that is, "proof of serious difficulty in
controlling behavior ... in light of such features of the case as the nature
of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality
itself."52
These cases present a striking contrast to the judicial use of DNA.
Not only is the problem of conflicting expert medical evidence ever pre-
sent, the terms employed in the statute - for example, "mental abnor-
mality" - do not have a medical genesis. 53 Unlike other commitment
statutes, which require a specifically diagnosed mental illness, 54 the req-
uisite mental condition for sexual predators is a fact-based inquiry that is
ultimately open to judicial interpretation. 55
Some within the medical and legal communities have also argued
that the required causal link from the presence of a mental abnormality to
the "likelihood" of future dangerousness is a difficult prediction.56 They
maintain that the standard of dangerousness should be revised to require
only an assessment of current risk posed, not to predict propensities for
future dangerousness, 57 which may be beyond the scope of a mental
health professional's expertise. 58 Physicians - experts in the field -
are not of one voice on causation or predictions of dangerousness.
48 See id. at 411.
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 411-13.
52 Id. at 413.
53 See Hamilton, supra note 29, at 491.
54 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(l)(c), (d) (McKinney's 1994); see also
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.27(a), 9.37(a) (McKinney 2002); In re David B., 97 N.Y.2d 267
(2002).
55 See Parry, supra note 34, at 318.
56 See id. at 319. In terms of sexually violent predator statutes, one researcher reported
"there have been no reported cases successfully challenging the existence of such a link [from
the presence of a mental abnormality to future dangerousness] once any of a wide range of
mental conditions has been established." Id. at 320.
57 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(c) (2002) (describing a person who is "likely
to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence" under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator statute
as a one whose "propensity to commit" such acts is "of such a degree as to pose a menace to
the health and safety of others").
58 See Hamilton, supra note 29, at 505-06 ("[T]he American Psychiatric Association
states that any 'psychiatric prediction that someone like Crane presents a near-term threat of
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The determination of dangerousness under traditional commitment
statutes is different. In a recent Court of Appeals case, Matter of David
B., we examined the New York standard for the civil retention of insanity
acquittees.5 9 The individual must suffer from a mental illness and pres-
ently constitute a physical danger to self or others or have such impaired
judgment that he or she is unable to understand the need for essential
care and treatment. 60 The standards are similar under our involuntary
civil commitment statutes. 6' The likelihood of harm in those cases in-
cludes an impaired understanding of the necessity for immediate care and
treatment of a mental illness 62 or a substantial risk of physical harm that
has already manifested itself in threats or other actual, specific violent
conduct towards oneself or others. 63 Similarly, New York's Sex Of-
fender Registration Act, known as Megan's Law, 64 also attempts a cali-
brated method of current risk assessment for sex offenders.
65
The new statutes create a tension that produces a curious result from
the standpoint of traditional criminal culpability. An offender can first
be subject to a criminal conviction, signifying that he deserved punish-
ment for blameworthy conduct because his conduct was a product of his
own choosing. Thereafter, however, upon a finding that an offender has
a mental abnormality that makes it likely he will not be able to control
his conduct in the future, the state may civilly commit him. Taking Hen-
dricks as an example, if he were unable to control his conduct, as deter-
mined after the commitment hearing, was he criminally responsible in
the initial proceeding? 66 It seems that the two statutes, one allowing the
conviction and the other requiring commitment, envision different kinds
of control. Criminal liability is absolved only when you cannot appreci-
ate the "wrongfulness" of your acts, whereas civil commitment is pre-
mised on the likelihood that you will act even though you know the act to
be wrong.
serious harm is inherently uncertain."'); see also Adam J. Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness
and Criminal Responsibility: The Constitutional Boundaries of Civil Commitment After Kan-
sas v. Hendricks, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 117, 143 (1999) (indicating one element of the civil
commitment standard should be present dangerousness).
59 In re David B., 97 N.Y.2d 267 (2002).
60 See id. at 278-79; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 330.20 (McKinney 1994).
61 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. Law §§ 9.27, 9.37 (McKinney 2002).
62 See id. §§ 9.27(a), 9.01.
63 See id. at §§ 9.37(a), 9.01.
64 See N.Y. CORRECT. §168 (McKinney 2002).
65 See id. at § 168-1(5). In assessing the risk of a repeat offense by a convicted sex
offender, the statutory Board of Examiners considers several factors in addition to whether the
offender has a mental abnormality, including detailed criminal history, counseling or treatment
received or to be received, the response to treatment, and the offender's age and physical
condition, among others. Id.
66 See Falk, supra note 58, at 119-20.
WHEN LAW AND MEDICINE COLLIDE
What does all of this tell us? That psychiatric medicine informs
legal determinations of mental health issues to a great extent, but the law/
medicine relationship in this area is often strained. We humans are an
interesting species; the diseases of our minds are subtle and complex.
Should we expect the problems those diseases create to be any less? At
the end of the day, we must recognize what separates us and what binds
us. Doctors diagnose and treat patients; courts assess conduct and deter-
mine its implications for the individual and society.67 In performing our
respective functions, we are often cast together whether we like it or not.
Henry is a young African-American who clearly has a number of
issues in his life. His physical appearance in court - head down, voice
at a whisper - raises questions in my mind. Does he hear me? Does he
understand what I am saying? Henry has been institutionalized before
for psychotic episodes. Now he is living alone and when he does not go
to clinic and take his medicine, he gets into trouble.
Henry steals lawn mowers and sells them to buy crack. His latest
lawn mower campaign has brought him before me on a burglary charge.
Henry entered an attached garage, a major tactical mistake because an
attached garage under the law is considered part of a residence. Now
Henry is charged with a violent felony.
What am I to do with Henry? In 1993, when Henry was before me,
my options were limited; put him in jail or risk another crime spree be-
cause probation supervision was not structured to address Henry's
problems.
Today, under the leadership of our Chief Judge, a new model of
legal/medical cooperation is being tested in Brooklyn. The Mental
Health Court seeks to address the underlying mental health issues of a
number of criminal defendants, while processing their cases. 68 Modeled
on the highly successful drug courts and domestic violence courts, this
court seeks to bring the judicial process to focus on the defendant's
mental health needs and to act as an aggressive clearinghouse for a num-
ber of mental health services. The hope is that the court will be able to
intervene and stop the cycle of crime and institutionalization while ad-
dressing the defendant's illness and its often interrelated dependencies on
67 Pauline Newman, Law and Science: The Testing of Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. LAW 419, 427 (2000) ("Ultimately, law is revered not for its ability to ferret out objective
truth, but for its reflection of societal concerns, its powerful moral underpinnings, its suste-
nance of the ideal of justice").
68 See Center for Court Innovation, Brooklyn Mental Health Court Synopsis, at www.
courtinnovation.org/demo_mhealth.html (last visited March 4, 2003); see also Elizabeth Stull,
Brooklyn Mental Health Court Opens: A New Part in the Criminal Justice System, BROOKLYN
DAILY BULL., Mar. 27, 2002, at 12.
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drugs and alcohol. 69 There are skeptics who maintain mental illness is
just that, an illness. Drug courts and domestic abuse courts address voli-
tional conduct even though it has a mental health component. Will the
mental health court be able to utilize its legitimacy and authority to alter
the behavior of defendants with mental health issues? The jury is still
out.
But what is startling is that the court steps beyond its adjudicative
responsibilities to act as a one-stop center where one's legal problems
and mental health concerns are addressed together. It recognizes that
your job and my job have common ground, treating Henry and reducing
crime while assessing social responsibility for antisocial conduct. There
are a lot of Henrys out there.
It was the Henrys of the world that fascinated Charles Steinberg.
He knew that law and medicine each had a vital role in his client's well
being. His was a world not just of statutes and cases, but of people and
the problems they faced. He did his best to merge the two for the benefit
of those who asked for his help. It is in his honor that we gather here
today, we will continue to honor him by realizing that law and medical
science have much to give to each other.
69 See DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, Rethinking the Revolving Door: A Look at
Mental Illness in the Courts (2001), at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/mental-health.pdf
(last visited March 4, 2003).
